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Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens:
Parental Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted
Diseases
Jonathan Klick*
Florida State University
Thomas Stratmann**
George Mason University
Laws requiring minors to seek parental consent or to notify a parent prior to
obtaining an abortion raise the cost of risky sex for teenagers. Assuming choices
to engage in risky sex are made rationally, parental involvement laws should
lead to less risky sex among teens, either because of a reduction of sexual ac-
tivity altogether or because teens will be more fastidious in the use of birth con-
trol ex ante. Using gonorrhea rates among older women to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across states, our results indicate that the enactment
of parental involvement laws significantly reduces risky sexual activity among
teenage girls. We estimate reductions in gonorrhea rates of 20% for Hispanics
and 12% for whites. Although we find a relatively small reduction in rates for
black girls, it is not statistically significant. We speculate that the racial hetero-
geneity has to do with differences in family structure across races.
1. Introduction
Teenage sex is often described in visceral or emotional terms, with reason and
calculation playing little or no part in the decision to engage in sexual activity.
Even some social scientists argue that the rational choice model inadequately
describes sexual behavior among teens (e.g., Loewenstein 1996).
It is not surprising then that most of the discussion concerning laws that
require a minor to obtain her parent’s consent or, at least, to inform one of
her parents that she plans to get an abortion centers on issues arising after
the teen has engaged in risky sex. Supporters of these laws focus on parents’
right to know about or directly influence their child’s health-care decisions.
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Many supporters explicitly embrace the laws as part of an antiabortion
agenda.
Opponents, on the other hand, frame their arguments in terms of the teen-
agers’ rights. Also, a common rhetorical argument against the laws involves
the suggestion that if teens are not responsible enough to decide for themselves
whether or not to get an abortion, they are certainly not responsible enough to
take care of a child (e.g., Schrag 2005).
However, it is possible that passage of parental involvement laws will affect
the incentives teenagers face, inducing them to engage in less risky sex which
would decrease the demand for abortion without increasing the incidence of
teen motherhood. That is, if teens implicitly view abortion as a form of birth
control, increasing the psychic costs of obtaining an abortion through parental
involvement laws may induce teens to substitute toward other forms of birth
control such as condoms, birth control pills, or abstaining from sex altogether.
For this substitution effect to occur, however, teens must be forward looking in
their decision-making process regarding their sexual activities, and parental
involvement must represent a nontrivial increase in the total cost faced by
a teen when obtaining an abortion.
We examine the effect of parental involvement laws on the decision to en-
gage in risky sex using Centers for Disease Control (CDC) data on the inci-
dence of gonorrhea among teenage girls. Using gonorrhea rates among adult
women to control for contemporaneous variation in unobservable character-
istics of the state population, we find that parental involvement laws reduce
teen gonorrhea rates by 20% for Hispanics and 12% for white teens. The
effects are smaller and not statistically significant for young black women.
The results are robust to a wide range of empirical specifications. These results
suggest that parental involvement laws reduce risky sexual behavior among
teens as predicted by a model in which teens consider costs and benefits when
deciding to engage in sexual activities.
In Section 2, we present the theoretical underpinnings of our inquiry, and in
Section 3, we discuss the existing studies of the effects of parental involvement
laws. Section 4 describes our data and identification strategy, and results are
provided in Section 5.
2. Teenage Sex and Incentives
As described in Klick and Stratmann (2003) and Levine and Staiger (2004)
abortion effectively serves an insurance function. That is, if unintended preg-
nancy is viewed as a risk of sex, having the option to abort the pregnancy low-
ers the cost of engaging in the sex. Further, in the decision to use some kind of
ex ante birth control, such as condoms or birth control pills, the abortion option
lowers the marginal benefit of contraception. Thus, if individuals are forward
looking when making decisions regarding their sexual behavior, lowering the
cost of abortion through legalization, subsidization, or technological progress
that improves the safety of abortions will lead to an increase in risky sexual
activity, on the margin, as individuals both have more sex and substitute away
from ex ante birth control measures.
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Levine and Staiger (2004) present evidence in support of this incentive effect
of abortion availability using changes in abortion laws in Eastern Europe to
identify the effect. Specifically, they find that the pregnancy rate rises by about
25%when countries switched from laws that allowed abortion only when some
medical or social hardship could be documented (e.g., carrying pregnancy to
term would threaten the mother’s life) to an abortion upon request system,
relative to other countries that did not change their abortion laws at the same
time.
There is some concern that the presence of illegal abortions might be driving
this result. That is, under the more restrictive abortion policy, perhaps women
simply procured illegal abortions. Pregnancies resolved in this manner would
not show up in the pregnancy rate data, which is calculated as the number of
abortions plus the number of live births per 1000 women aged 15–44. If there
are a large number of illegal abortions in countries which restrict access to
abortion to only those cases where the mother’s health is in danger, switching
to an on-demand system would generate a spurious incentive effect as previ-
ously unobserved abortions would now appear in the official pregnancy rate
even in the absence of any change in underlying behavior.
Tomitigate this concern, Levine and Staiger (2004) also examine the effect of
changing abortion access on the death rates of females aged 15–44 relative to
males of the sameage cohort.Assuming that illegal abortions tend to be less safe,
if the switch from restricted abortion availability to on-demand abortion simply
substituted safer abortions for unsafe abortions that would have been obtained
illegally, there should have been a decrease in the female death rate. However,
Levine and Staiger (2004) find no such increase, lending support to the incentive
explanation for their pregnancy rate finding. However, it should be noted that
death is a fairly rare outcomeeven in illegal abortions, so this testmaynotbevery
powerful in detecting any substitution between illegal and legal abortions.
Klick and Stratmann (2003) attempt to avoid the data problem illegal abor-
tions represent in examining pregnancy rates by focusing on the incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) as a proxy for the incidence of risky
sex (Klick 2004). That is, since more sex in the aggregate and the substitution
toward sex without a condom will both lead to an increase in STDs, increasing
abortion access will lead to an increase in STD incidence if individuals are for-
ward looking in their decision to engage in risky sex.Klick andStratmann (2003)
examine the ‘‘double experiment’’ provided by US abortion policy to examine
this link. They find that when Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York, and
Washington legalized abortion on demand in the period 1969–1970, the gonor-
rhea and syphilis rates in those states rose significantly compared to the rest of the
country. When the Supreme Court legalized abortion on demand nationwide in
1973, the STD gap between the early legalizers and other states disappeared.
Both studies, however, rely on aggregate data that do not allow the research-
ers to focus on teens specifically. It may be the case, in both instances, that
support for the abortion as insurance model is driven by changes in the behav-
ior of older individuals. If teens do not engage in rational calculation in their
sex decisions, as suggested by Loewenstein (1996), because their behavior is
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determined almost entirely by biological forces or social construction1 or be-
cause they place excessive weight on the immediate benefits of sex while
highly discounting the future costs (Loewenstein and Furstenberg 1991), then
abortion access will not affect the sexual behavior of teens.
In addition to providing some insights into the potential differences between
youth and adult decision-making processes, examining how teens react to
changes in abortion access has practical implications as well. If the Klick
and Stratmann (2003) results hold for teens, it would be useful for epidemi-
ologists to explicitly model changes in abortion access in their models of the
spread of STDs among teens.2 Further, such evidence might play a role in eval-
uating the welfare effects of abortion policies aimed at teens. More generally,
the sensitivity of teens to the costs and benefits of sex is important for predict-
ing the efficacy of any social policy meant to affect teen sexual behavior.3
In the context of laws requiring a young woman below the age of 18 to in-
form a parent or guardian about her decision prior to obtaining an abortion and
laws requiring parental consent, the psychic costs of obtaining an abortion are
raised if (1) the young woman’s parents are unaware of the extent of her sexual
activity, assuming the young woman expects them to be disapproving of such
behavior, and/or (2) the young woman’s parents are opposed to abortion mor-
ally (or she believes they are).
In the former case, requiring the young woman to inform her parents before
getting an abortion prohibits her from concealing the pregnancy, which is proof
of her behavior, from her parents. In the latter case, under a parental consent
law, acquiring consent will be relatively difficult or, perhaps, impossible. In this
regard, even under a notification law, there is likely to be some psychic cost to
the young woman to the extent that her parents’ feelings affect her own utility.
There is likely to be significant heterogeneity across groups with respect to
these issues. For example, a young Catholic woman from a close family might
be more likely to want to conceal her sexual behavior from her parents and she
might suffer more anguish because her parents know she is having an abortion
compared with a nonreligious young woman from a broken home.
3. Prior Studies of Parental Involvement Laws
Levine (2003) studies the effect of parental involvement laws on teen behavior
by again focusing on pregnancy rates, abortion rates, and birth rates among 15-
to 17-year-olds as compared to women from older cohorts. He finds that the
adoption of a parental involvement law, controlling for state and year effects,
state-specific trends, and a host of other variables, leads to a statistically
1. Baumeister and Vohs (2004) suggest that these two perspectives have dominated the field of
sexuality.
2. Weinstock et al. (2004) report that nearly half the newly reported STD infections in the
United States each year are found among individuals in the 15–24 age range.
3. For example, Ayres and Baker (2005) suggest that criminalizing reckless sex (defined as
having sex without a condom during one’s first sexual experience with a particular person) would
likely reduce both STD incidence and acquaintance rape. As they note, the benefits of such a law
would be especially significant for teenage girls.
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significant decline in the abortion rate for the affected age-group but not for the
age-groups that were not affected by the laws. His results for pregnancy and
birth rates are more mixed with statistical significance in the estimates for the
affected age-group depending on whether or not state-specific trends were in-
cluded and what years of data were used to estimate the regressions; however,
the signs of the coefficients in all the regressions, as well as the relative mag-
nitudes of the coefficients in the 15- to 17-year-olds’ regressions relative to the
other age cohorts, are consistent with the hypothesis that parental involvement
laws reduce risky sex among minors.
As in Levine and Staiger (2004), this study is neither able to rule out the
possibility that teens substitute toward illegal or informal abortions when in-
volvement laws go into effect nor able to rule out the possibility that teens
obtain abortions out of state. Any of these possibilities could be driving
the Levine results, in addition to the changing incentives hypothesis.
Levine (2004) is also able to examine whether the reduction in risky sex
comes about because of an increase in the use of birth control or because
of a reduction in sexual activity altogether. Using responses from the 1988
and 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, Levine finds that the adoption
of parental involvement laws is associated with a reduction in the probability
that a respondent in the 15- to 18-year age-group indicated that she had en-
gaged in unprotected sexual activity. His results suggest that this reduction was
driven by a reduction in individuals indicating they had failed to use contra-
ception during the last time they had sexual intercourse, as opposed to not
engaging in intercourse at all.
Tomal (1999) studied the effects of parental consent and notification laws
separately. She finds that both kinds of involvement laws are associated with
significantly higher birth rates and significantly lower abortion rates for both
affected and unaffected teens, suggesting that there are important temporal
effects that inhibit the isolation of the incentive effect of involvement laws
on teens. For example, it could be the case that the adoption of parental in-
volvement laws reflects an underlying antiabortion sentiment in the state that
could make abortion relatively more costly for all individuals, regardless of
whether the laws apply to them or not. The passage of such laws could track
antiabortion protests that have the effect of driving abortion providers out of
the state. Failure to control for these temporal effects could generate spurious
correlations with the passage of involvement laws.
Bitler and Zavodny (2001) present results suggesting that parental involve-
ment laws reduce the number of first-trimester abortions, leading to an increase
in the proportion of abortions which take place after the first trimester. Their
results in this regard are sensitive to whether or not they correct for autocor-
relation. Medoff (1999) finds no statistically significant effect of involvement
laws on state abortion rates (i.e., not broken down by trimester).
Joyce and Kaestner (1996) examine data from South Carolina, Tennessee,
andVirginia, finding an effect of parental consent laws only in the case of South
Carolina for nonblack minors on the order of a 10% reduction in the likelihood
of obtaining an abortion. On the whole, they conclude that the effect of parental
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consent laws is small. This conclusion conflicts with those of Haas-Wilson
(1996), who found that parental involvement laws were associated with a large
decrease in the abortion rate for minors.
Interestingly, in a more recent article examining the experience of Texas
whose parental notification law went into effect in 2000, Joyce et al.
(2006) find a significant effect on the abortion rates of those women covered
by the law relative to 18-year-old women.
4. Gonorrhea Rates as a Proxy for Risky Sexual Behavior
Interestingly, by focusing on pregnancy rates and abortion rates as the depen-
dent variable, all the studies discussed in Section 3 suffer from an inability to
deal with the problem of illegal abortions. Again, if parental involvement laws
simply push minors into obtaining illegal abortions, the estimates described
above could simply involve spurious correlations as illegal or informal
(e.g., inflicting damage to the young woman’s abdomen in hopes of generating
a miscarriage) abortions drop out of the abortion rate and pregnancy rate data.
Although the Levine and Staiger (2002) analysis of female death rates cuts
against this possibility, they cannot rule it out if death from illegal and informal
abortions is fairly rare.
To avoid this problem, we adopt the strategy originated in Klick and Strat-
mann (2003) of focusing on STD rates as our measure of risky sexual behavior.
Specifically, we use the incidence of gonorrhea among women under the age of
20 as our proxy for risky sex. The choice of gonorrhea is driven by a handful of
factors. First, along with syphilis and chlamydia, gonorrhea is the only STD for
which the CDC has consistent data by age-group and by race. Gonorrhea has
a very short incubation period, is easily cured, and, other than mother-to-infant
infections, is only transmitted by sexual intercourse (Sen 2003).
We avoided using chlamydia because the data are only available after 1996,
which would not allow us to exploit many of the parental involvement
law changes. Syphilis also was rejected, given some of the peculiar character-
istics of the disease that make it unattractive for our purposes. Specifically,
syphilis has largely been eradicated among women with much of the disease’s
incidence occurring among the homosexual male population for whom
pregnancy concerns are not a cost of risky sex (Klick and Stratmann 2003).
The dependent variable we focus on then is the number of female gonorrhea
cases per 100,000 female population in a state in the under-20 age category for
the years 1981 through 1998. Although this ‘‘treatment group’’ is slightly over-
inclusive with respect to the parental involvement laws, which apply to indi-
viduals under 18 years of age, the data do not allow us to examine gonorrhea
rates for only those under 18. Inclusion of 18- and 19-year-oldswill serve to bias
any estimate of the causal effect of parental involvement laws toward zero. We
perform separate regressions forHispanic teenagers, black teenagers, andwhite
teenagers since the underlying gonorrhea rates differ substantially by race.
Our parental involvement law variable comes from Bitler and Zavodny
(2001) and equals 1 for a year in which the state had either a parental noti-
fication or consent law in effect for the entire year. For years in which a state
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adopted or got rid of such a law, the variable measures the fraction of the year
during which the law was in effect. All other state–year combinations take the
value of 0.4
To control for unobservable effects, we include the gonorrhea rate among
women in the 20 and older age-group. Although it is possible that there could
be cross-group infections which would contaminate our control group, any
such cross-group effects will bias our estimate of the effect of involvement
laws on the under-20 gonorrhea rate toward zero. We are essentially imple-
menting the specification Levine and Staiger (2002) used to examine the effect
of abortion laws on female death rates.5 We also control for time-invariant
state effects and year effects that are common to all states as well as state-spe-
cific trends. Descriptive statistics by race are presented in Table 1.
The regressions we run take the following form, where s denotes the state,
t denotes the year, and ðs tÞ captures the state-specific trends with a denoting
the age-group (under 20; 20 and older):
ratestaunder20 ¼ a  lawst þ b  ratesta20þ þ ks þ st þH  ðss  tÞ;
where the regressions are run separately by race and are weighted by the rel-
evant race’s population of women under the age of 20.6
5. Is Teen Sexual Behavior Sensitive to Incentives?
We present the results of our analysis in Table 2. In addition to the state-
specific trend specification laid out above, we also present results whenwe drop
state trends.7 Further, given the concerns raised by Bertrand et al. (2004) about
serial correlation in difference-in-difference studies, we present three sets of
standard errors (SEs) for each coefficient. In addition to robust SEs, which
allow for heteroskedasticity, we implement two of the serial correlation
remedies suggested by Bertrand et al. In the first, we calculate the Newey–West
Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent estimator of the SEs, choosing
the potential lag structure optimally, as described in Stock and Watson
(2003:505–506). We also present SEs clustered by state.
4. Bitler and Zavodny construct their data from Merz et al. (1995) and Blank et al. (1996),
updating subsequent years with data from NARAL and the Alan Guttmacher Institute.
5. The duplication is not exact. Levine and Staiger (2002) regressed ln(female death rate/male
death rate) on a vector of explanatory variables X, which is equivalent to regressing ln(female death
rate) on vector Xwith the addition of ln(male death rate) as an explanatory variable. The results we
present in Section 5 are robust to regressing ln(under-20 gonorrhea rate) on the involvement law
variable and ln(20 and over gonorrhea rate) with state- and year-fixed effects and state-specific
trends. We chose to present the nonlogged specification since there are many observations with
a 0 under-20 gonorrhea rate which would be lost in the log specification.
6. The results that follow are effectively unchanged if we also include a number of state-level
covariates, such as per capita income, education levels, religious composition, and so on. Since we
include gonorrhea rates for women 20 years and older, any generic effect of these state-level cova-
riates should be controlled through their effect on adult gonorrhea rates.
7. We also examined specifications including state-specific quadratic and cubic trends. These
specifications generated results almost identical to those presented for the state-specific linear trend
case. These results are available upon request.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean SD
Involvement Law Percent of year state enforced a parental
notification or consent law regarding
abortions for minors
0.280 0.439
Consent Law Percent of year state had a parental
consent law in place regarding
abortions for minors
0.175 0.374
Enjoined Law Percent of year state had a parental
involvement law in place but its
enforcement was enjoined by court
action or it was effectively enjoined by
a state attorney general’s public
decision not to enforce the law
0.197 0.389
Hispanic (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic women below the age of 20
per 100,000 Hispanic women under
the age of 20 in the state
57.402 65.774
Gonorrhea rate20þ Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic women 20 or older per
100,000 Hispanic women 20 or older
in the state
64.099 83.249
Hispanic (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic men below the age of 20 per
100,000 Hispanic men under the age
of 20 in the state
42.945 57.731
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Number of gonorrhea cases among
Hispanic men 20 or older per 100,000
Hispanic men 20 or older in the state
123.554 181.157
Black (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
women below the age of 20 per
100,000 black women under the age
of 20 in the state
927.223 694.490
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
women 20 or older per 100,000 black
women 20 or older in the state
772.665 602.098
Black (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
men below the age of 20 per 100,000
blackmen under the age of 20 in the state
748.087 642.344
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Number of gonorrhea cases among black
men or older per 100,000 blackmen 20 or
older in the state
1686.458 1308.767
White (female)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among
white women below the age of 20 per
100,000 white women under the age of
20 in the state
80.194 87.968
Continued
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For all races and for all specifications, we find that the effect of parental
involvement laws on gonorrhea rates for women under the age of 20 is neg-
ative. However, none of the specifications for black gonorrhea rates generates
a statistically significant coefficient on the parental involvement law. For each
of the specifications for Hispanic and white gonorrhea rates that include state-
specific trends (including those with quadratic or cubic state-specific trends
which are not reported here), there is a statistically significant negative effect
of parental involvement laws on female teen gonorrhea rates. For each race, the
coefficient’s magnitude is larger when state trends are included, suggesting
Table 1. Continued
Variable Description Mean SD
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Number of gonorrhea cases among white
women 20 or older per 100,000 white
women 20 or older in the state
47.432 56.007
White (male)
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Number of gonorrhea cases among white
men below the age of 20 per 100,000
white men under the age of 20 in the state
31.406 64.709
Gonorrhea
rate20þ
Number of gonorrhea cases among white
men 20 or older per 100,000 white men
20 or older in the state
74.929 162.125
Involvement Law data come from Bitler and Zavodny (1999), and the gonorrhea data were generated by the CDC,
Division of Sexually Transmitted Diseases.
Table 2. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population
Hispanic
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20 Black
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20 White
Gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Involvement law –4.905 –12.048 –36.610 –40.723 –0.816 –9.541
(4.306) (5.801)** (35.041) (40.497) (2.473) (2.765)***
[5.001] [5.560]** [43.618] (47.239) [3.247] [3.130]***
{6.350} {5.648}** {57.081} {69.777} {4.814} {5.309}*
Gonorrhea rate20þ 0.560 0.536 0.971 0.930 1.415 1.407
(0.025)*** (0.038)*** (0.043)*** (0.056)*** (0.043)*** (0.068)***
[0.028]*** [0.039]*** [0.050]*** [0.062]*** [0.053]*** [0.077]***
{0.034}*** {0.047}*** [0.068}*** {0.080}*** {0.083}*** {0.125}***
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trends None Linear None Linear None Linear
Observations 911 911 912 912 912 912
R2 0.920 0.938 0.938 0.947 0.945 0.962
Robust SEs are given in parentheses; Newey–West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) SEs are given in
brackets; and SEs clustered by state are given in curly brackets. All regressions were weighted using the population of
females under the age of 20 of the given race for each state. For the Newey–West HAC estimators of the SEs, we chose
the lag structure optimally as discussed in Stock and Watson (2003:505–506).
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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that involvement laws tend to be adopted as teen gonorrhea rates are already
trending downward. Thus, inclusion of state trends may help to mitigate any
potential simultaneity bias.
For young Hispanic women, parental involvement laws are associated with
a decline of 12 cases of gonorrhea per 100,000 population. This effect is both
statistically significant (p ¼ 0.038) and of practical importance as it represents
a decline of about 21% relative to the average Hispanic teen female gonorrhea
rate. The effect for young white women, a reduction of 9.5 cases per 100,000
population) is also statistically significant (p ¼ 0.001) and represents a decline
of about 12% relative to the average rate. The statistical significance of these
effects is robust to the various SE calculations. We also employed the Are-
llano–Bond (1991) estimator to explicitly model the potentially dynamic causal
effect, allowing for up to a 2-year distributed lag, and the results were essentially
the same (not reported).8 Although the effect among young black women gen-
erates the coefficient with the largest magnitude (41), it is not statistically sig-
nificant and the relative effect is fairly small, representinga reductionofonly4%.
For all races, the rate of gonorrhea among women 20 and older is positively
and significantly related to the under-20 gonorrhea rate. The regressions all
explain more than 93% of the variation in the data.
5.1 More General Time Effect
As a robustness check on our Table 2 results, we also estimated models allow-
ing for more general time effects. Specifically, in the difference-in-difference
model presented above, we are only able to estimate time-invariant state
effects. However, if unobservable state characteristics are changing over time
and those effects are related to the passage of parental involvement laws, our
results will suffer from an omitted-variables bias. For example, if views about
abortion among a state’s residents are changing over time, we may find that
increasing social conservatism has both an effect on sexual behavior (e.g., less
premarital sex, more monogamy, etc.) and the adoption of public policy (e.g.,
parental involvement laws). This simultaneity would generate a positive as-
sociation between abortion laws and gonorrhea rates even if there is no true
effect of parental involvement laws on teenage sexual behavior.
Arguably, controlling for the gonorrhea rates of those aged 20 and older mit-
igates thisconcern tosomedegree,associalpressuresaffectingteenswouldlikely
affect older women as well. However, in the specifications provided in Table 2,
wepool the relationshipbetweenteengonorrhearatesandadultgonorrhearates in
one coefficient that is common to all states and years. A more general model
would allow for these social effects to differ by state, as well as over time.
To allow for this generality, we present a difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) model which uses the adult gonorrhea rates as a within-state
8. The xtabond routine in Stata does not allow for weights, so the resulting magnitudes are not
directly comparable in principle, though they differed very little in magnitude and did not differ at
all in sign or statistical significance. The Arellano–Bond (1991) diagnostic statistic suggested that
the series exhibits a 1-year lag structure.
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control group for each observation of teenage female gonorrhea rates. That is,
we now estimate a regression that includes separate year effects for each state,
separate year effects for each age-group, as well as age-group–specific state
effects. We also allow for age-group–specific state trends. In this specification,
we are identifying the effect of a parental involvement law by examining the
average change in the relationship between teen and adult gonorrhea rates be-
fore and after the adoption of the law, net of any contemporaneous changes in
the relationship in nonadopting states as well as any preexisting trends in the
relationship in adopting states.
More formally, we estimate:
ratesta ¼ a  lawsta þ ksa þ sta þ Tst þH  ðssa  tÞ;
where lawsta takes the value of the percent of year t in which state s had a pa-
rental involvement law in place for the observations on teenage female gon-
orrhea rates and zero for all other observations (i.e., all adult female gonorrhea
rates and teenage female gonorrhea rates in states with no parental involve-
ment law). ksa represents the time-invariant age-specific state-fixed effects; sta
represents the age-group–specific year dummies that are common to all states;
Tst represents the state-specific year dummies; the last term represents the age-
group–specific and state-specific trends.
Wepresent the results from thisDDDspecification inTable 3.Once again,we
find that all races exhibit a negative effect of parental involvement laws on teen-
age female gonorrhea rates. Again, the results are not statistically significant for
blackwomen, even though themagnitude of the effect is the largest for this race.
For Hispanics and whites, statistical significance is sensitive to the time trend
included, with the Hispanic coefficient being significant in the no-trend model,
but not the others, whereas the white coefficient is significant in all the trend
models (including the quadratic- and cubic-trend models not presented here).
For our purposes, it ismost important to note that time-varying unobserved state
effects do not appear to be biasing the difference-in-difference results presented
in Table 2, since the more general DDD specifications of Table 3 generate coef-
ficients that are generally as large or larger than the Table 2 results.9
9. Parallel work by Dee and Sen (2006) finds no effect of parental involvement laws on teen
gonorrhea rates in a triple-differences framework. This difference arises primarily because they do
not include age-specific state trends in their triple-difference specifications (and they do not ex-
amine rates among Hispanics). They also raise some concerns regarding the use of weighted least
squares (WLS), suggesting that weighting might be improper in this context since the magnitude of
the point estimates differs between the ordinary least squares (OLS) and WLS specifications by
more than 50%. Interestingly, in the specifications with age-group–specific state trends, the dif-
ference in point estimates between the OLS and WLS triple-difference specifications is much
smaller, mitigating their concerns about weighting. On the arguments for using WLS in this con-
text, see Greene (2000) andWooldridge (2003), who argue that WLS provides greater efficiency in
some contexts. Specifically, when using rates as the dependent variable, states with larger pop-
ulations are likely to have lower error variance in their rates. It is also arguable, from a practical
standpoint, that when estimating average treatment effects on incidence rates, weighted estimators
are more relevant, given the large differences in state populations.
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5.2 The Effects of Enjoining a Parental Involvement Law
Although the DDD results provide some comfort that our treatment effect is
not driven by time-varying unobservables, there is another test we can exploit
to examine the potential endogeneity of parental involvement laws. In a num-
ber of states, after the legislature passes an involvement law, state courts have
ruled the laws to be impermissible under the federal or state constitution,
enjoining their enforcement or the state attorney general has made a similar
decision, effectively enjoining the law due to its public decision not to enforce
the law. These decisions to enjoin the law will be largely orthogonal to un-
derlying voter sentiment. Thus, if this sentiment is driving our treatment effect,
we should find that the effect of enjoining the law has approximately the same
effect on gonorrhea rates as does the law’s passage.
On the other hand, if the effect is reduced, it suggests that the law itself,
independent of any underlying social pressures or attitudes, has an effect
on teenage sexual behavior through the channels discussed above. We likely
would not expect the effect to drop to zero if the law is enjoined for a few
reasons. First, the timing of the enjoinment is precise, whereas the gonorrhea
data are aggregated annually. Second, if teens are making decisions probabi-
listically, they will recognize the potentially temporary nature of enjoining the
law since a higher court may reverse the decision quickly or the legislature
may redraft the law to respond to the decision to enjoin the law.
InTable 4,we investigate this test, showing that the coefficient on an enjoined
law is substantially lower than the effect of an enforced law. Specifically, for
Hispanics and whites, the enjoined law generates a coefficient that is roughly
one-third as large as the coefficient on the enforced law. The enjoined law co-
efficient is not statistically significant for Hispanics but it is for whites, though
the difference between the enforced law coefficient and the enjoined law co-
efficient for whites is statistically significant at the 1% level. For the regressions
examining black gonorrhea rates, we find a positive coefficient on the enjoined
laws, though it is not statistically significant, perhaps further indicating the dif-
fering dynamics of black gonorrhea rates relative to the other races examined.
Table 4. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population Effect of Enjoining Parental Involvement Laws
Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20
White gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Involvement law –13.846 (5.988)** –33.164 (43.059) –13.275 (3.545)***
Enjoined law –4.476 (3.038) 12.840 (37.972) –5.932 (2.867)**
Gonorrhea rate20þ 0.538 (0.038)*** 0.931 (0.056)*** 1.404 (0.067)***
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
State trends Linear Linear Linear
Observations 911 912 912
R2 0.939 0.947 0.963
Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of females under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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5.3 Differences Across Categories of Laws
We have treated parental involvement laws generically until now. However,
there may be differences between notification laws and consent laws. Effec-
tively, both laws have a notification component since it would not be possible
to obtain parental consent without simultaneously providing notification.
However, consent laws may provide an additional deterrent if parents are
likely to stop their daughter from receiving an abortion.
To examine how much of the effect we identify is purely a notification ef-
fect, we reran the Table 2 regressions adding a variable taking the value of the
percent of a year the state had a parental consent law in effect. Thus, our in-
volvement law coefficient will indicate the effect of the notification require-
ment on behavior, whereas the consent coefficient will indicate the marginal
effect from also requiring parental consent for abortion access.
As shown in Table 5, for both Hispanics and whites, we find that all the
identified effect comes from the notification requirement. For neither race
is the consent coefficient statistically significant. Once again, however, the
black regressions exhibit a different pattern. Although in these regressions
black female teen gonorrhea rates exhibit a statistically significant decline
when notification is required, they actually exhibit a statistically significant
increase when consent is required. We have no intuition for this result, but
it does seem to further indicate that the dynamics of black gonorrhea rates
differ from those of Hispanics and whites.
5.4 Effects on Male Gonorrhea Rates
As one further robustness check on our results, we also examined the effect of
parental involvement laws on gonorrhea rates among teenage males. In prin-
ciple, since it seems likely that most individuals have sexual relations within
their own peer group, if the posited causal mechanism is generating the results
presented above, we should find a similar effect among males. If females are
deterred from having risky sex because of the parental involvement laws, their
Table 5. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Female Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
per 100,000 Population Notification and Consent
Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20
White gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Involvement law –12.957 (8.057) –191.032 (63.869)*** –8.984 (3.621)***
Consent law 2.094 (10.776) 217.381 (71.759)*** -0.991 (5.591)
Gonorrhea rate20þ 0.536 (0.038)*** 0.930 (0.056)*** 1.406 (0.068)***
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
State trends Linear Linear Linear
Observations 911 912 912
R2 0.938 0.947 0.962
Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of females under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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male partners will also be limited in their opportunities for risky sex. However,
since the burden of the involvement laws will fall on teenage girls, we should
expect the effect to be mitigated for males, as they can always substitute to-
ward having risky sex with older women who are unaffected by the laws. This
substitution strategy will not be available to female teens.
The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with this as we find that both
Hispanic and white male teenage gonorrhea rates are negatively related to the
passage of a parental involvement law, though the effects are smaller than
those observed for female gonorrhea rates and they are not statistically signif-
icant. Once again, however, we find black rates behaving differently, gener-
ating a positive coefficient on the parental involvement laws, though it is not
statistically significant.
The results in Tables 2–6 provide robust evidence of the incentive effect of
restricted abortion availability in teenagers’ decisions regarding risky sex, at
least for Hispanic and white teenage women. This suggests that Hispanic and
white teenage women are forward looking in their sex decisions, and they sys-
tematically view informing their parents and obtaining parental consent as ad-
ditional costs in obtaining an abortion, inducing them to engage in less risky
sex when parental involvement laws are adopted. Unfortunately, the data do
not allow us to differentiate between the possibility that teens engage in less
sex and they simply have the same amount of sex but are more fastidious in
their condom use. Both these causal mechanisms would generate the results we
observe. Levine’s (2003) results would suggest that the latter mechanism is
driving our results, though we cannot rule out the possibility that both mech-
anisms are at work here.10 Along those lines, however, we can rule out the
Table 6. The Effect of Parental Involvement Laws on Male Teenage Gonorrhea Rates per
100,000 Population
Hispanic gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Black gonorrhea
rateunder 20
White gonorrhea
rateunder 20
Involvement law –7.670 (5.951) 13.857 (35.129) –3.055 (1.946)
Gonorrhea rate20þ 0.238 (0.018)*** 0.364 (0.015)*** 0.316 (0.022)***
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
State trends Linear Linear Linear
Observations 911 912 912
R2 0.947 0.941 0.933
Robust SEs are given in parentheses. As above, all regressions are weighted using the population of males under the
age of 20 for the given race for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
10. To the extent that public opinion accurately reflects which causal mechanism is at work, in
an October 1989 poll printed in the Parents magazine, 62% of respondents indicated that they
thought laws restricting abortion access for teens would make teens at least somewhat more likely
to use contraception (compared to 35%who thought the laws would have no effect), whereas in the
same poll, only 16% of respondents indicated that these laws would induce teens to curtail their
sexual activity.
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possibility that teens simply substitute to risky sexual behaviors for which
pregnancy is not a concern, such as oral or anal intercourse since these sets
of behavior would also transmit gonorrhea. Further, more fastidious use of
birth control pills also would not generate the effect we identify.
6. Why Is There Racial Heterogeneity?
In addition to our Hispanic and white results collectively suggesting that teen
sexual behaviors respond to the additional costs generated by parental involve-
ment laws, the black results collectively raise a puzzle. Not only do black gon-
orrhea rates exhibit the statistically significant systematic decline when
parental involvement laws are adopted but also black male rates appear to rise
and female rates appear to rise in the presence of a consent law and when a no-
tification law is enjoined. The dynamics of gonorrhea rates among black teens
appear to differ from those among Hispanics and whites.
These differential results could lead to a number of different inferences, but
we are unable to choose among them on the basis of our analysis. Perhaps the
fact that black gonorrhea rates are somuch higher in general makes a difference
in howmuch a behavioral change affects aggregate disease rates. Another pos-
sibility is that there is little cost involved with a young black woman informing
her parents about her pregnancy.11 Perhaps there is more communication about
sexual issues in black families, implying that the event of a pregnancy provides
little new information about a child’s sexual behavior. Also, perhaps black
parents are less likely to view abortion negatively. There is some evidence
on this point as some surveys indicate that black individuals are more likely
than white and Hispanic individuals to believe that abortion should be legal.12
The high proportion of Hispanics who are Catholic could help to explain the
relatively large effect of parental involvement laws on the behavior of His-
panic teens.
Even if none of those hypotheses is correct, it could be the case that black
teens experience less disutility than their Hispanic and white counterparts
when they disappoint their parents. Lastly, it could be the case that the relation-
ships between black teens and their families does not systematically differ
from the relationships in Hispanic and white families, but black teens have
significantly higher discount rates that cause them to discount the future costs
of sex (including parental disapproval) relatively more than teens from the
11. For example,Wells and Twenge (2005) find that black teens are significantly more likely to
be sexually active than are white and Hispanic teens. In their study, they found that 62% of black
teens were sexually active compared with only 40% of whites and 44% of Hispanics. Thus, it may
be the case that notifying a black parent that her daughter is seeking an abortion provides relatively
little new information about the daughter’s sexual behavior since it was more likely than not that
the daughter was sexually active. The same would not generally be true for white and Hispanic
daughters.
12. Ladd and Bowman (1999) report 1992 and 1996 survey results suggesting that 67% of
black individuals believed that abortion should be legal in most or all cases compared to 57%
of Hispanics and 64% of whites in 1992 and 58% of Hispanics and 58% of whites in 1996.
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other groups,13 or perhaps there is more across age-group sex among black
individuals than there is among Hispanic or white individuals.14
To get to the bottom of this heterogeneity, we examine the extent to which
family structure influences our results. Census data are potentially enlighten-
ing here. It is clear that Hispanic and white families in the United States look
very similar in terms of structure during the period we studied, at least relative
to black families. For example, using data from the Household and Family
Characteristics report that is part of the March Supplement to the Current Pop-
ulation Survey for the last year included in our study (1998),15 it would appear
that the percent of family households that are headed by a married couple is
much lower for blacks (47%) than it is for either Hispanics (69%) or whites
(81%). Excluding the Northeast, which has a relatively low percent of His-
panic family households headed by a married couple, the gap between blacks
and the other two groups is even bigger. Arguably, the cost borne by a teenager
for informing her parents about her sexual behavior will be higher in family
households that are intact.
Unfortunately, census does not report family structure data at the state level,
so it is not possible to control for family structure directly in our regressions.
However, if we allow for results to differ by region, wemight be able to discern
whether the treatment effect of involvement laws differs in a way that makes
sense in light of what we know about differences in family structure across
regions. The most striking difference in family structure, as noted above, is
found in a comparison of Hispanic households in the Northeast with Hispanic
households in the rest of the country. In 1998, whereas the percent of Hispanic
family households headed by amarried couple for the Northeast was only 52%,
in the Midwest, South, and West it was 73%, 74%, and 71%, respectively.
To analyze if these differences in Hispanic family structure lead to differ-
ences in treatment effects, we ran the regression from Table 2 above with three
different sets of treatment effects. First, we performed one specification with
a separate treatment effect for each region. The second specification allowed
for a common treatment effect for the Midwest, the South, and the West and
a separate treatment effect for the Northeast. Lastly, we estimated a regression
with one general treatment effect for all four regions and a separate treatment
effect for the Northeast. The results are presented in Table 7.
Our intuition about the effect of family structure appears to be consistent
with our estimates. In the regression with four separate treatment effects, al-
though all are negative, the coefficients for the Midwest, South, and West are
all about twice as large in magnitude as the coefficient for the Northeast,
13. For some research regarding racial differences in discount rates, see Warner and Pleeter
(2001), whose research suggests that blacks individuals exhibit systematically higher subjective
discount rates compared to whites.
14. If there is significantly more sex between adults and teens among black individuals, pa-
rental involvement laws might have a large negative effect on the gonorrhea rate found among our
contemporaneous control group, implicitly lowering the estimated treatment effect.
15. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last accessed
on 21 July 2006).
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though the difference is not statistically significant owing to the large SEs. In
the specification that pools the effects in the Midwest, South, and West allow-
ing for a separate Northeast effect, we find that the non-Northeast effect is
statistically significant and it is twice as large as the treatment effect in the
Northeast, though the difference between the coefficients is still not statisti-
cally significant. Lastly, we find the same basic result in the specification that
allows for a generic effect for all regions plus an additional effect for the
Northeast, finding a statistically significant negative generic treatment ef-
fect and a positive treatment effect for the Northeast that is not statistically
significant.
These results may provide some general clues as to our failure to find a sta-
tistically significant treatment effect for black teens, given that they are much
more likely to live in households where two parents are not present. However,
it is not possible to test this intuition in even the indirect way described above
since there are no stark differences in black family structure across regions.16
7. Conclusion
Incentives matter. Theymatter even in activities as primal as sex, and theymat-
ter even among teenagers, who are conventionally thought to be short-sighted.
If the expected costs of risky sex are raised, teens will substitute toward less
risky activities such as protected sex or abstinence. In addition to modeling the
decision-making processes of teenagers, this insight is important in other con-
texts as well. Many public policies can be improved by recognizing the sen-
sitivity of teenage sexual decisions to costs and benefits.
We study one set of policies in this article. We show that increasing the cost
of abortion for teens lowers the insurance value of abortion. This induces
Table 7. Regional Treatment Effects for Hispanics
Involvement law—Northeast –6.516 (18.464) –6.523 (18.442) 6.407 (19.384)
Involvement law—Midwest –12.086 (8.969) — —
Involvement law—South –15.345 (8.727) — —
Involvement law—West –12.189 (11.885) — —
Involvement law—Not NE — –12.929 (6.062)** —
Involvement law — — –12.929 (6.062)**
Gonorrhea rate20þ 0.536 (0.038)*** 0.536 (0.038)*** 0.536 (0.038)***
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
State trends Linear Linear Linear
Observations 911 911 911
Robust SEs are given in parentheses. All regressions were weighted using the population of Hispanic females under the
age of 20 for each state.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
16. For example, in 1998, the percent of black family households headed by a married couple
was 43, 45, 48, and 50, respectively, for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
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teenage girls to avoid risky sex, which will likely have the effect of lowering
pregnancy rates, abortion rates, and birth rates among this group of individuals.
Although these positive effects alone might not justify parental involvement
laws, they presumably should not be ignored in the debate.17 Behavior is not
static, and claims based on the assumption of static behavior are flawed.
From a practical standpoint, this study reinforces the claim made in Klick
and Stratmann (2003) that epidemiologists could improve models of the spread
of STDs by incorporating the behavioral effects induced by changes in abor-
tion access. However, those effects may differ by race, religion, or family
structure, and more research is needed to determine the relative contribution
of these factors to the behavioral effects of abortion access.
From an academic standpoint, our results support the conclusion reached in
Levine (2004) that teens do view abortion as pregnancy insurance and the en-
actment of parental involvement laws induces teens to substitute away from
risky sex. Although being consistent with the Levine results, by focusing on
gonorrhea rates instead of abortion and pregnancy rates, we avoid the data
problem posed by illegal, informal, and out-of-state abortions which limit con-
fidence in the earlier studies.
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